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The recent surge in the scope of computer applications in medical care has brought with it great strides in patient care, 
but it has also created a variety of concerns to manufacturers of medical software. The spate of product liability suits, 
with its potentially crippling effects in terms of product development, makes it increasingly vital that manufacturers 
engage in prospective planning, to anticipate problems and take steps before legal action ensues, so that all 
par t ies-- the  manufacturer, the hospital, and ultimately, the pat ient- -benef i t  from the availability of new technology. 
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Congress are similarly grappling with the implications of this new 
technology, to assure that patient care is not compromised by products that have not yet been fully tested. The tension 
between the desire to make technology available to the public and the realities of the present regulatory and litigious 
climate is the key dilemma facing manufacturers of medical software. 
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1. Introduction 
The surge in the scope of computer applications in 
medical care has brought with it great benefits in 
terms of patient care, but it has also raised a 
variety of concerns regarding the implications of 
this new technology. The intent of this paper is to 
highlight some of the most salient issues of con- 
cern to manufacturers of computer systems for the 
health care industry. 
The starting point is whether software is subject 
to FDA regulation as a 'medical device' under the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976. If so, what 
steps are necessary to gain FDA approval? The 
second area of concern involves liability issues, 
including theories of liability, warnings, the role of 
standards, and legislative approaches to solving 
the liability crisis. Third, which is the optimal 
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strategy for the marketing of computer compo- 
n e n t s - t h e  sale, lease, or licensing of software and 
hardware? With these broad parameters in mind, 
let us turn to the regulatory side of the picture. 
2. Regulatory issues 
The Medical Device Amendments to the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act [1], and implement- 
ing regulations, extend federal regulation to the 
design, manufacture, testing, scale, and to a cer- 
tain extent, even the storage and use of medical 
devices. A 'medical device' is broadly defined to 
include every product, other than drugs, used in 
the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of disease 
in humans or animals [2]. Although the definition 
includes devices used in connection with animal 
diseases, most of the implementing regulations 
have focused only on devices used in connection 
with disease in humans. 
Both hardware (instrument, apparatus, imple- 
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ment, machine') and software ('contrivance') which 
are "intended for use in the diagnosis of disease 
or other conditions, or in the cure, mitagation, 
treatment or prevention of disease, in man" or 
" intended to affect the structure or any function 
of the body" constitute medical devices [3]. Many 
computer-related products are medical devices be- 
cause they come within the scope of the definition 
as a "component,  part, or accessory." These in- 
clude products from secondary sources and from 
manufacturers other than the supplier of the 
primary device. 
Software that actively manipulates patient data 
and uses the results to control a change in device 
operation or patient treatment, is considered to be 
a medical device for purposes of the Act. On the 
other hand, systems for passive recording, re- 
trieval, and display of medical history data, encod- 
ing, storage, and display of medical textbooks and 
articles, and encoding of electromagnetic trans- 
mission will not be regulated [4]. 
Manufacturers of software deemed to be 
medical devices (unless qualifying for an exempt- 
ion, such as for investigational use, which must be 
approved in advance [5]) must comply with a 
variety of controls. These include: establishment 
registration, describing the 'manufacturer ' ;  device 
listing, describing every device manufactured by 
each registered establishment; good manufactur- 
ing practice regulations, describing safe manufac- 
turing, and quality control requirements; pre- 
market notification, under which the FDA must 
be notified ninety days in advance before market- 
ing a new device not substantially equivalent to an 
old classified device; compliance inspections by 
the FDA; prohibitions against misbranding and 
adulteration; procedures under which FDA may 
ban or detain dangerous devices. 
The next question that arises is through which 
route should a manufacturer seek to clear the 
regulatory barrier in marketing a system--pre-  
market approval (PMA) or premarket notification 
(510(k) [6])? The simplest, [6] least costly, and 
fastest way to get a new device on the market is to 
file a 510(k) notification, and for these reasons, 
the 510(k) submission has become the option of 
choice wherever possible [7]. 
There are several advantages to the 510(k) route. 
On its face, it is far easier to satisfy than seeking 
premarket approval under section 515 of the 
Amendments. Unlike the latter, safety and ef- 
fectiveness data are not explicitly required, only a 
showing of "substantial equivalence" to a pre-ex- 
isting device (i.e. that the device is "just an exten- 
sion of existing systems"). Under 510(k), a com- 
pany can normally obtain FDA acceptance 
without clinical trials or, indeed, even without 
developing a physical prototype. The chances of 
avoiding FDA disapproval of the marketing of the 
device improve significantly with a 510(k), and 
510(k) is more likely to result in a speedy, as well 
as a favorable, disposition than a PMA. 
There may be situations where a PMA could be 
advantageous, as, for example, where a company 
has already gathered safety and effectiveness data 
and, thus, might find its market position vis-a-vis 
competitors stronger if it could establish that a 
specific new device requires a PMA. The 510(k) 
route might also be less desirable if patent infrin- 
gement looms as a potential issue. Although the 
FDA has explicitly taken the position that "sub- 
stantial equivalence" to a specified pre-amend- 
ment device is not based on patentable character- 
istics, some practitioners recommend the addition 
of a statement on all 510(k) notices that claims of 
substantial equivalence is intended to have no 
bearing on the resolution of patent matters [8]. 
The submission of a 510(k) application does 
not, however, preclude the FDA from seeking 
safety and efficacy data. Several manufacturers of 
N d : Y A G  lasers, for example, have been advised 
by the agency to file a hybrid 510(k), to include 
such data, under a catch-all provision allowing the 
agency to "seek any additional information it 
deems necessary". In view of increasing criticisms 
by a House Subcommittee [9] and the General 
Accounting Office [10] challenging FDA's use of 
510(k)s without explicit safety and effectiveness 
determinations, the FDA will in all likelihood 
increase its demands for such notifications, par- 
ticularly with respect to Class III devices [11]. 
The entire issue of software regulation in health 
care is currently under review in Congress. On 21 
April 1986, hearings were held [12] before the 
House Science and Technology Subcommittee to 
assess whether further regulation is necessary to 
protect the public. The concern of many  of the 
witnesses, however, was that the tide of regulation 
might indeed stifle innovation and the growth of 
technology to the detriment of patient care. 
3. Liability issues 
To win a health care product liability suit, the 
plaintiff must show that the product was defec- 
tive, that the product had not been altered since 
its manufacture, and that the defect caused the 
injury. The first element is whether there is a 
'product . '  The distinction between what is viewed 
as a 'p roduct '  vs. a 'service' is p ivo ta l - -war ran ty  
law applies only to ' products, '  not 'services' (such 
as medical care). If  viewed as a 'product , '  a 'strict 
liability' standard will most likely apply; but if 
viewed as a 'service,' the manufacturer  will likely 
be held to a 'negligence' standard. 
The second element is that there be a 'defect. '  
There are three ways in which a product may be 
adjudged defect ive-- through improper  manufac- 
turing (unintended aberration in the manufac- 
turing process), improper design (manufacturer 's  
conscious choice to design a product in certain 
manner), or failure to warn of dangers in the 
product. The latter may constitute a defect even in 
the absence of a physical imperfection in the 
product. 
Finally, evidence must show that the defect is 
attributable to the manufacturer  rather than to the 
acts of a third party, and that the injuries suffered 
were caused by use of the defective product. If the 
hospital misuses or changes a product in any way, 
the hospital, not the original manufacturer,  would 
be held responsible. An exception might exist if 
the manufacturer told the hospital that the prod- 
uct could or was intended to be used as an attach- 
ment to another product. 
The issue of warnings is a highly litigated area 
in the product liability field as well as of major 
concern to the FDA. The question of failure to 
warn arises with respect to whether there is a 
'defect. '  A manufacturer has a duty to warn of 
those dangers that are known or reasonably fore- 
seeable at the time of marketing. That  duty ex- 
tends to providing directions or instructions that 
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describe how to avoid the risk or danger associ- 
ated with a product and the means for using the 
product safely. The courts generally hold the 
manufacturer  to the skill and knowledge of an 
expert in the field, and charge him with the duty 
of keeping abreast of scientific knowledge and 
new developments in the field. 
To arrive at a determination that a product is 
unreasonably unsafe because of inadequate warn- 
ings or instructions, the trier of fact must find 
that, at the time of manufacture, the likelihood 
that the product would cause claimants harm, and 
the seriousness of the harms, rendered the manu- 
facturer's instructions inadequate, and that the 
manufacturer could have and should have pro- 
vided such warnings or instructions [13]. In ad- 
dition to dangers known or foreseeable at the time 
of marketing, the manufacturer  has a duty to act 
with reasonable care upon learning of defects or 
risks associated with products already in the stream 
of commerce, and to make prudent efforts to 
inform product users of newly discovered dangers. 
Medically related products liability cases often 
center on the manufacturer 's  failure to adequately 
warn physicians of possible dangers. The plaintiff 
must show that the warning was unreasonable 
under the circumstances and that an adequate 
warning would have altered the physician's con- 
duct. The court (and, in its own context, the FDA) 
will look to product inserts, labels, instruction 
manuals, letters from companies to physicians, 
oral representations by salespersons, the medical 
device itself, the Physician's Desk Reference, and 
other manufacturer sources to show what repre- 
sentations were made by the company to the 
physicians. Thus, otherwise adequate warnings 
may be diluted by the manufacturer 's  total 
marketing plan. 
The purpose of a warning is to eliminate, or 
significantly reduce, risk of injury from a hazard 
for which there is no design alternative that will 
accomplish the same purpose. Since a warning 
must induce conscious action, or inaction, on the 
part  of the user, the message should contain three 
elements: the nature of the hazard, the risk of 
injury to be avoided, and the action that must be 
taken to eliminate the risk of injury. 
The issue of sufficiency of a warning is typi- 
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cally a jury question, to be resolved based upon 
factors such as the dangerous nature of the prod- 
uct, how the product is used, the form and inten- 
sity of the warning, the burden of providing a 
warning, and the probabili ty that the warning will 
be communicated to those who may foreseeably 
use the product, and in a way so that the user 
population will likely understand the nature and 
extent of the danger. In sum, warnings, to be 
effective, must be selective and call the consumer 's  
attention to a danger that has a real probabil i ty of 
occurring and whose impact will be significant 
[141. 
Aside from certain isolated cases of statutory 
regulations (e.g. the warning on cigarette pack- 
ages), the actual wording, size, graphics, etc., as 
well as identification of all the hazards, are left to 
the creativity of the manufacturer.  By and large 
this is true for other governmental regulatory 
activities, voluntary consensus standards (e.g. In- 
ternational Standards Organization, American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers), and for those 
few corporations that have active labeling pro- 
grams (e.g. Westinghouse, FMC Corp.). 
Standards are considered floors, not ceilings, 
with respect to a manufacturer 's  duty (i.e. they 
reflect the least the manufacturer should do in 
designing, producing, and marketing a product). 
The courts have, for the most part, uniformly held 
that a careful manufacturer  would use a higher 
level of care than that represented by the stan- 
dard, where other foreseeable uses and misuses of 
a product would so dictate. This reasoning applies 
as much for applicable federal regulatory stan- 
dards as it does for voluntary consensus or in- 
dustry standards. 
Failure to adhere even to an applicable volun- 
tary or industry standard is tantamount  to liability 
per se but adherence to a standard will not auto- 
matically absolve a manufacturer  of liability. It 
becomes a question of fact for a jury to decide 
whether or not a manufacturer  should have used a 
higher standard [15]. 
Where a standard provides for a specific design 
requirement, or a specific test requirement (e.g. the 
crush distance for a specific load applied to a car 
roof), however, the manufacturer can at least argue 
that the r isk/uti l i ty considerations inherent in the 
design or test requirements of the standard repre- 
sents the appropriate tradeoffs. If a manufacturer  
has considered all of the competing considerations 
that govern selection of a design or test require- 
ment  and has explicitly concluded that the stan- 
dard represents the appropriate balance, then this 
can be an effective response to a plaintiff 's con- 
tention that the manufacturer can deflect the 
argument away from product design to those 
responsible for writing the standard [16]. 
There are three major theories of liability in 
products cases. First, is breach of warranty. There 
are two types of warranty- -express  and implied. 
An express warranty is any affirmation of material 
fact upon which a customer relies. Express war- 
ranty applies when the manufacturer has explicitly 
guaranteed that the product is able to meet certain 
standards. This generally occurs in contracts. A 
contract with a manufacturer may state, for exam- 
ple, that the manufacturer will sterilize and seal all 
products and that they will arrive in an ap- 
propriate sterilized condition. If  infection occurs 
due to the product (and not due to improper  
handling by the hospital staff), the manufacturer  
may be found liable for breach of an express 
warranty. 
In contrast, an implied warranty derives by 
implication or inference from the nature of the 
transaction, or from the relative situation or cir- 
cumstances of the parties. It  springs from the 
presumed intention of the parties. Stated another 
way, "a  warranty that the goods shall be merchan- 
table is implied in a contract for their sale if the 
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that 
kind" (UCC, §2-314). A 'merchant '  is generally 
defined as someone who deals in goods of the 
kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself 
out as having special knowledge or skill to the 
practices or goods involved in the transaction. It 
should be noted that a recent case, applying strict 
liability to used products, has greatly expanded 
the scope of those that are considered 'merchants '  
and thus, at least in Massachusetts, it appears that 
a large number  of sellers who previously had been 
immune from strict liability will now become 
potential defendants [17]. 
The second major theory of liability is negli- 
gence. Negligence is a violation of the duty to use 
care with respect to a person to whom a duty of 
care is owed. It  occurs whenever the manufacturer  
does not take reasonable care in producing the 
product. Negligence in products cases usually 
involves failure to warn or to warn adequately 
against foreseeable dangers, a failure to fully 
inspect or test, a failure in either design or produc- 
tion to comply with standards imposed by law, or 
to live up to the customary standards of the 
industry. 
Yet a third ground for liability is strict liability. 
The theory of 'strict liability in torts' is very 
similar to 'b reach  of warranty'  under the Uniform 
Commercial  Code. In neither case the plaintiff 
must prove negligence. Under  breach of warranty, 
all plaintiff must prove is the breach of an implied 
warranty, the injury, and a causal connection be- 
tween the two. Thus, while only four states have 
not adopted the doctrine of 'strict liability in tort, '  
they accomplish the same results. 
The Second Restatement of Torts, Sect. 402A, 
published by the American Law Institute in 1965, 
has been widely adopted by the courts as a 
description of the rules of strict tort liability. That  
section provides that: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective 
condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer or to his property is sub- 
ject to liability for physical harm thereby 
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or 
to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 
selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user 
or consumer without substantial change in 
the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies 
although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care 
in the preparation and sale of his product, 
and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought 
the product from or entered into any con- 
tractual relation with the seller [18]. 
Besides situations where products are found to 
be "unreasonably  dangerous," sellers have been 
held liable in strict tort when their product has 
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failed to confirm with their public representations 
of its quality: 
One engaged in the business of selling chattels 
who, by advertising, labels, or otherwise, makes 
to the public a misrepresentation of a material 
fact concerning the character or quality of a 
chattel sold by him is subject to liability for 
physical harm to a consumer caused by justifia- 
ble reliance upon the misrepresentation, even 
though: 
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, 
and 
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel 
from or entered into any contractual relation 
with the seller [19], 
The scope of liability under a strict product 
liability theory appears to have been widening 
with the past year or two. See, for example, Fer- 
ragamo v. Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority 
[20] (transit authority that sold old trolley car 'as  
is' for scrap metal held strictly liable to a scrap 
worker who was killed by poisonous gas while 
dismantling the cars), expanding the doctrine to 
used products; Kelly v. R.G. Industries [21] (gun 
manufacturer and retailer) may be strictly liable to 
an innocent person killed or injured by a 'Satur- 
day Night Special,' not because handguns are 
"unreasonably  dangerous," but because this type 
of gun has "little or no legitimate purpose in 
today's society" (i.e. solely on the basis of public 
policy). 
There may also be differences in what the 
plaintiff may tell the jury, depending on whether 
suit is brought in strict liability or negligence. The 
Nevada Supreme Court, in Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 
[22] held that in a strict liability action the jury 
may be told that the manufacturer changed the 
product after the plaintiffs  accident despite a 
state statute that such evidence could not be used 
to prove a defendant 's "culpable conduct." The 
court ruled that this refers only to negligence and 
not to strict products liability. 
Despite the gloomy picture, from the perspec- 
tive of the manufacturer,  the courts have not left 
the manufacturer completely helpless. More and 
more courts are allowing defendants in 'strict 
products liability' cases to reduce awards by as- 
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serting plaintiff's 'comparative negligence' as a 
defense. See, for example, Vannoy v. Uniroyal 
Tire Company [23] (strict liability suit, based on 
explosion of a tire; the court, citing at least seven 
other courts which have applied comparative ne- 
gligence principles to strict liability actions, con- 
cluded that there should be no difference between 
the way the cause of the accident is assessed in 
regular negligence cases and in strict products 
liability cases). 
Further, it should be realized that even under 
the theory of strict liability in tort, the mere fact 
that an accident involving a medical device has 
occurred is not a sufficient basis to impose liabil- 
ity since the manufacturer is not an insurer of his 
product. It is the concept of 'defect' that marks 
the zone of liability. 
The liability crisis has sparked debate as to its 
causes, existence and solutions in a wide variety of 
circles. The Reagan administration, on 30 April 
1986 sent Congress three proposals to limit damage 
awards in personal injury lawsuits and to revamp 
product liability law, in response to what has been 
described as a crisis in the liability insurance 
industry. The proposed legislation would override 
current state laws dealing with product liability 
and limit payment for "pa in  and suffering" and 
punitive damages, limit lawyers' contingency fees, 
and would eliminate the concept of " joint  and 
several liability," which makes everyone who is 
responsible for an accident liable for the entire 
damage award regardless of their degree of fault. 
It would also permit damage awards to be paid in 
installments, rather than in lump sums [24]. Simi- 
larly, Proposition 51 was passed in the June 1986 
primary in California limiting "joint  and several 
liability" of defendants to only "pa in  and suffer- 
ing" they caused directly. Previously, joint and 
several liability, which evolved through court deci- 
sions and not statute, could be used to force a 
defendant with as little as 1% of responsibility for 
an injury to pay 100% of the damages if other 
defendants cannot pay their share. Thus, this rep- 
resents a major change in California law and 
portends a trend already manifest in legislation 
proposed in Michigan and New York, and 38 
other states. 
4. Marketing strategy issues--sale, lease, and 
licensing of hardware and software 
A key issue of risk management is whether to sell 
outright, lease, or license computer systems. The 
optimal choice, at least with respect to the soft- 
ware component, depends on whether medical 
software is considered a 'product '  ('strict liabifity' 
standard) or a 'service' ('negligence' standard). 
Medical computer programs will most likely be 
treated as 'products '  by the courts, subjecting 
their manufacturers to strict liability for any de- 
fects in the program that cause injury [25]. This 
view is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's analysis 
in RRX Industries v. Lab-Con, Inc., where the 
Court stated that " the  employee training, repair 
services and system upgrading were incidental to 
sale of the software package and did not defeat 
characterization of the system as a good" [26]. 
The issues of ownership and control are crucial 
in distinguishing products from services. Once a 
clearly defined sale or similar transaction takes 
place, whether through a lease, gift, or trade, the 
manufacturer's exposure to liability is established. 
The actual risk of liability, however, varies, based 
on the amount of control retained by the manu- 
facturer. 
In reference to software design, if the hospital 
purchases the programmer's time on an hourly 
basis, the hospital is more likely to be considered 
a manufacturer than a purchaser. If the hospital 
buys the rights and usage of the particular pro- 
grammer, it is more likely to be considered a 
purchaser. If the hospital, in attempting to recoup 
the cost of developing a system, sells the system to 
another user (e.g. charges individual departments 
for such usage), it probably will be considered a 
manufacturer. Thus, there can be more than one 
manufacturer for liability purposes. 
Involvement of the purchaser (hospital) in de- 
sign, application, and updating is desirable from 
the manufacturer's standpoint, both in terms of 
reduction in liability consequences (joint and 
several liability) and on the issue of allocation of 
damages. This, of course, assumes that the system 
user and provider are separate entities. Profes- 
sionals and hospitals are most likely to be held 
liable for the errors of systems attributable to their 
own efforts, at least when they are the source of  a 
faulty program. 
The optimal solution f rom the manufac turer ' s  
perspective appears to be the sale of  the hardware,  
and the licensing of the software component .  Al- 
though leasing medical hardware would, at first 
glance, appear  to provide advantages in terms of  
greater exclusivity and control  of the product ,  
such benefits could be attained through patents  to 
protect  design characteristics; through contractual  
provisions, providing for the confidential i ty of  the 
existence or terms of  contracts,  training and other  
materials; and through the protect ion of trade 
secrets with far less exposure to liability. Thus, on  
balance, the lesser liability risk is to sell rather 
than lease the hardware.  
Software licensing has distinct advantages over 
the sale of  the program. Licensing conveys a fight 
of  use, without  passing title of  the software or 
even of the right to copy  the program. While 
software can be sold, the usual t ransact ion in- 
volves a license to use. In its simplest form, a 
software license is a contract  by  which the licensor 
grants the licensee permission to use the software 
in certain ways subject to certain restrictions. Un-  
der such an agreement, the licensor not  only re- 
tains full ownership of the software, but  can re- 
strict the licensee's use of the software in many  
critical respects. These restrictions are used to 
achieve an impor tant  goa l - -p ro t ec t i on  of  the 
potential market  for the software package [27]. 
The advantages of  licensing are protect ion of  
proprietary rights through:  
(1) Protection of confidentiali ty by contract.  
(2) Preservation of copyright  without  making the 
work subject to the ' f irst  sale' doctrine (i.e. that  
where the end user (hospital) is also the owner  of 
the program copy, the end user has the exclusive 
right to sell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of  title 
to the copy. Thus, the manufacturer ,  not  the 
hospital, retains the right to sell, transfer, etc. 
(3) May help avoid application of  U C C  implied 
warranty provisions. 
(4) Binds user to restrictions on product  use even 
if an infringing user does not  sign and return the 
agreement, the manufac turer  may  sue for misap- 
propriat ion.  In  suit for misappropr ia t ion  a signifi- 
cant  factor will be to convince the court  that  trade 
secrets protect ion is being seriously pursued. 
Thus, software licensing provides distinct 
vantages over the alternatives. 
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5. New trends 
The maze of federal regulations, legislative pro- 
posals, and the serious potential  for personal  in- 
ju ry  lawsuits with large damage awards makes 
development  of a comprehensive risk management  
p rogram vital, bo th  to assure compliance with 
federal s tandards and for the protect ion of  the 
manufac turer  and the public safety alike. 
While no assurances can be made that legal 
action or liability can be avoided, prospective 
planning can clearly ensure that  steps may  be 
taken to minimize the risk. The best guarantee is, 
of  course, a safe product .  By ensuring op t imum 
safety and reliability of computer  hardware and 
software, the manufacturer ,  the hospital, and, 
ultimately, the patient  may  all benefit f rom the 
availability of new technology. This is the final 
objective of regu la to ry /publ ic  health agencies such 
as the FDA,  the manufacturer ,  and the ultimate 
user. 
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Appendix: FDA device classes 
Sec. 513 [360c] (a) (1) There are established the 
following classes of devices intended for human 
use :  
(A) Class I, General Controls 
(i) A device for which the controls authorized 
by or under section 501,502, 510, 516, 518, 519, or 
520 or any combination of such sections are suffi- 
cient to provide reasonable assurance of the safety 
and effectiveness of the device. 
(ii) A device for which insufficient information 
exists to determine that the controls referred to in 
clause (i) are sufficient to provide reasonable as- 
surance of the safety and effectiveness of the 
device or to establish a performance standard to 
provide such assurance, but because i t - -  
" ( I )  is not purported or represented to be for a 
use in supporting or sustaining human life or 
for a use which is of substantial importance in 
preventing impairment of human health, and 
(II) does not present a potential unreasonable 
risk of illnesses or injury, 
is to be regulated by the controls referred to in 
clause (i). 
(B) Class II, Performance Standards 
A device which cannot be classified as a class I 
device because the controls authorized by or un- 
der section 501, 502, 510, 516, 518, 519, and 520 
by themselves are insufficient to provide reasona- 
ble assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the 
device, for which there is sufficient information to 
establish a performance standard to provide such 
assurance, and for which it is therefore necessary 
to establish for the device a performance standard 
under section 514 to provide reasonable assurance 
of its safety and effectiveness. 
(C) Class III ,  Premarket Approval  
A device which b e c a u s e -  
(i) it (I) cannot be classified as a class I device 
because insufficient information exists to de- 
termine that the controls authorized by or under 
sections 501, 502, 510, 516, 518, 519, and 520 are 
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of the 
safety and effectiveness of the device and (II) 
cannot be classified as a class II  device because 
insufficient information exists for the establish- 
ment of a performance standard to provide rea- 
sonable assurance of its Safety and effectiveness, 
and 
(ii) (I) is purported or represented to be for a 
use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a 
use which is of substantial importance in prevent- 
ing impairment of human health, or 
(II) presents a potential unreasonable risk of 
illness or injury, is to be subject, in accordance 
with section 515, to premarket  approval to provide 
reasonable assurance of its safety and effective- 
ness. 
If there is not sufficient information to estab- 
lish a performance standard for a device to pro- 
vide reasonable assurance of its safety and ef- 
fectiveness, the Secretary may conduct such activi- 
ties as may be necessary to develop or obtain such 
information. 
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